

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION**

VAN LYNN OWENS,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	No. 1:21-CV-157-AGF
)	
STODDARD COUNTY JAIL, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Van Lynn Owens, an inmate at the Mississippi County Jail, for leave to commence this civil action without prepaying fees or costs. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of \$9.20. Additionally, for the reasons explained below, the Court will give plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint, and will deny without prejudice his motion to appoint counsel.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action *in forma pauperis* is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The

agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. *Id.*

In support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted an inmate account statement showing an average monthly deposit of \$46.00, and an average monthly balance of \$22.85. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of \$9.20, which is twenty percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

This Court is required to review a complaint filed *in forma pauperis*, and must dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. *Id.* at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” *Id.* at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555).

This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” *Solomon v. Petray*, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Stone v. Harry*, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even *pro se* complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. *Martin v. Aubuchon*, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, *Stone*, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse the mistakes of those who proceed without counsel. *See McNeil v. United States*, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff filed the complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Stoddard County Jail, Sheriff Carl Hefner, County Commissioner Danny Talkington, Chief Deputy Andy Holden, and Acting Administrator Christina Craft. Plaintiff avers he sues Talkington in his official capacity, but does not specify the capacity in which he sues the remaining defendants. The Court therefore interprets the complaint as including only official-capacity claims. *See Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College*, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995) (“If a plaintiff’s complaint is silent about the capacity in which he is suing the defendant, [courts] interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity claims.”).

Plaintiff identifies his claims as “Denied Medical Attention Deliberate Indifference of medical needs.” He states his claims arose on July 14, 2021 at the Stoddard County Jail. He alleges he had a “previously messed up left shoulder,” and “Sheriff Carl Hefner, Andy Holden, Christina Craft, failed to take me to a doctor to see if I was injured. They went on the word of Sheriff Britton Ferrell & Joe Ross from Mississippi County Detention Center.”

Plaintiff provided a copy of an August 19, 2021 diagnostic imaging report that was performed due to plaintiff's complaints of left shoulder pain. The report documented no fracture or dislocation, but it did document degenerative changes, spurring, and subchondral cysts. Plaintiff notes those findings, and alleges he was "refused medical attention" for them. He claims Holden, Craft and Hefner said there was nothing they can do because Mississippi County officials told them there was nothing medically wrong with him.

Plaintiff includes a list of medical requests he began making in July of 2021, and the responses he received. The list does not detail any requests made to any of the named defendants. There are several requests to be seen for shoulder complaints that plaintiff described as "broken rotator cup." However, as noted above, it is apparent that plaintiff did in fact receive medical evaluation for his shoulder complaints, and was found to have no fracture. Plaintiff concludes: "They failed to provide me with medical attention by going with the word of Mississippi County Detention Center Deliberate Indifference of my medical needs."

Plaintiff describes his injuries as "serious injury to left shoulder. Deliberate Indifference of medical needs Denied Medical attention." He seeks a total of \$600,000 in damages.

Discussion

The complaint is subject to dismissal. The Stoddard County Jail is not an entity that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark.*, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (entities such as police departments are "not juridical entities suable as such. They are simply departments or subdivisions of the City government."). Plaintiff's official capacity claims against the remaining defendants are the equivalent of claims against their employers. *See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To the extent plaintiff can be understood to identify any defendant as employed by the Stoddard County Jail or the Sheriff's Department,

such claims fail because those entities cannot be sued under § 1983. *See Ketchum*, 974 F.2d at 82. To the extent plaintiff can be understood to identify any defendant as a municipal employee, his official capacity claims fail because the complaint fails to state a plausible municipal liability claim. *See Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

Even if plaintiff had sued Hefner, Talkington, Holden, and Craft in their individual capacities, his claims would fail. In setting forth his claims, plaintiff simply refers to the defendants collectively, and states they denied care and were “deliberately indifferent.” This Court is not required to presume the veracity of plaintiff’s conclusory statements. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678.

Additionally, plaintiff fails to explain how each named defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for any incident that injured him. “Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights.” *Madewell v. Roberts*, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). *See Martin v. Sargent*, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff). Moreover, by merely lumping the defendants into a group and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, plaintiff has failed to give any named defendant fair notice of the grounds for the claims made against him or her. This practice results in a pleading that fails to comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, the complaint fails to allege facts permitting the inference that plaintiff had a serious medical need that any individual defendant disregarded, and plaintiff was thereby injured. *See Butler v. Fletcher*, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting the deliberate indifference standard applies to a pretrial detainee’s claim that he was denied adequate medical care).

Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will replace the original. *See In re Wireless Telephone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litigation*, 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect”). Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on the Court’s prisoner civil rights complaint form, which will be provided to him. *See* E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A) (“All actions brought by self-represented plaintiffs or petitioners should be filed on Court-provided forms where applicable.”).

In the “Caption” section of the complaint form, plaintiff should write the name of the person he intends to sue. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties”). Plaintiff must avoid naming anyone as a defendant unless that person is directly related to his claim. Plaintiff must also specify whether he sues each defendant in his or her official capacity, individual capacity, or both. In the “Statement of Claim” section, plaintiff should begin by writing the defendant’s name. In separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, plaintiff should set forth a short and plain statement of the facts that support his claim or claims against that defendant. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Each averment must be simple, concise, and direct. *See id.* Plaintiff must state his claims in numbered paragraphs, and each paragraph should be “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). If plaintiff names a single defendant, he may set forth as many claims as he has against that defendant. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff names more than one defendant, he should only include claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or simply put, claims that are related to each other. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

It is important that plaintiff allege facts explaining how the defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for harming him. *See Madewell*, 909 F.2d at 1208. Plaintiff must explain the role of the defendant, so that the defendant will have notice of what he or she is accused of doing or failing to do. *See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that the essential function of a complaint “is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim.”). Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that the “Statement of Claim” requires more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” *See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp.*, 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2017). Finally, plaintiff is advised he may not amend the complaint by filing separate documents containing changes he wishes to make to certain parts. Instead, plaintiff must file a single comprehensive amended complaint that sets forth his claims for relief. *See Popoalii v. Correctional Medical Services*, 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that it is appropriate to deny leave to amend a complaint when a proposed amended complaint was not submitted with the motion).

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to appoint counsel. The motion will be denied at this time, without prejudice. A *pro se* litigant has “neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to appointed counsel in civil cases.” *Patterson v. Kelley*, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing *Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail*, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006)). A district court may appoint counsel in a civil case if it is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim . . . and where the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance of counsel.” *Id.* (citing *Johnson v. Williams*, 788 F.2d 1319, 1322 (8th Cir. 1986)). When determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the factual complexity of the issues, the litigant’s ability to investigate the facts and present his or her

claims, the existence of conflicting testimony, and the complexity of the legal arguments. *Id.* (citing *Phillips*, 437 F.3d at 794).

In this case, the Court is not convinced plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim. Additionally, there is no indication that plaintiff is incapable of representing himself, and nothing in the instant motion or in the record before the Court indicates that the factual or legal issues are sufficiently complex to justify the appointment of counsel. However, recognizing that circumstances may change, the Court will deny the motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice, and will entertain future such motions, if appropriate, as the case progresses.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion seeking leave to commence this action without prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 9) is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 4) is **DENIED** without prejudice.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of \$9.20. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall mail to plaintiff a copy of the Court's prisoner civil rights complaint form.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, plaintiff must file an amended complaint in accordance with the instructions herein.

Plaintiff's failure to timely comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this case, without prejudice and without further notice.

Dated this 2nd day of February, 2022.



AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE